It finally happened a trusted ransomware negotiator has been indicted for doing exactly what many in cybersecurity suspected would happen, deploying ransomware themselves. But this isn’t just a betrayal of trust it’s a case study in how insider intelligence about ransom dynamics, payment behaviors, and corporate vulnerabilities actually create more incentives for criminals.
The charged conduct in this case includes not only deploying ransomware, but also abusing privileged access gained through negotiation roles.
Here’s why this was inevitable, what the case reveals about the murky world of ransomware mediation, and how your organization should adapt.
The Case of Rogue Negotiator That Shattered the Trust
According to a detailed report by The Register (source), two former professionals Ryan Clifford Goldberg, who worked at the cybersecurity firm Sygnia as an incident response manager, and Kevin Tyler Martin, a negotiator at DigitalMint were charged with distributing ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware, according to court documents.
Key allegations include:
- Deploying ransomware against at least five U.S. companies from May to November 2023.
- Extorting $1.3 million from a single victim — a Florida-based tech firm.
- Operating through Telegram and Tutanota, impersonating ALPHV operators, and collecting cryptocurrency ransoms.
- Using credentials from previous IR engagements to access and exploit company environments.
Court documents allege that Goldberg and Martin were acting completely outside the scope of their employment at their respective companies. After mentioning Kevin Tyler Martin, digitalmint president Marc Grens stated that Martin was acting completely outside the scope of his employment and that the company is cooperating with authorities.
One of the accused was considered a flight risk and detained prior to trial.
The Real Threat: Weaponised Insider Intelligence
This is a case of someone privy to the inner working of ransomware negotiations using that knowledge to extort other, this employee likely had the following information available:
- Which types of companies are most likely to pay quickly.
- What security setups delay or derail ransomware response.
- Which negotiation strategies work and which ones fail.
- How much attackers can demand based on organizational size, sector, and pressure.
- The ability to identify and potentially compromise client data, including sensitive data, during or after incidents.
This kind of privileged operational intelligence allows a rogue actor to strategically select low-risk, high-reward targets. They’re not blindly casting a net they’re precision-targeting victims based on known ransom viability.
Ransomware Negotiation: From Mediator to Threat Vector
The assumption has long been that negotiators are “helpers” outside experts meant to reduce damage. But the reality is far murkier:
- Negotiators interact with threat actors daily, often gaining insights into ransomware affiliate structures and their incentives.
- They see which companies cave quickly, track insurance payouts, and learn which types of data hold maximum leverage.
- Some have access to payment infrastructure or company email systems even in cases where IR services are bundled.
- In some cases, those responsible for negotiating ransom payments can become ransomware threat negotiators themselves, blurring the line between defender and attacker.
Why This Was Always a Matter of “When,” Not “If”
The Industrialization of Ransomware
The ransomware economy has professionalised:
- Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) means affiliate structures.
- Ransomware gangs develop file encrypting malware and operate on a ransomware-as-a-service model, allowing affiliates to deploy the gang’s ransomware in attacks.
- Leak site managers, cryptowallet specialists, and negotiators all play distinct roles.
- Once roles are professionalized, they can be corrupted like any other job.
Financial Incentive Meets Frictionless Access
Why spend months phishing or building zero-days when you already:
- Know which companies pay the most,
- Have existing credentials from previous IR cases,
- And understand how to impersonate ransomware gangs?
That’s what Goldberg and Martin are accused of doing weaponising knowledge from inside the ransomware response world. Authorities allege they were deploying ransomware developed by criminal gangs and even launching their own ransomware attacks as part of the extortion-related scheme.
Implications for Every Organization Handling Ransomware
| Area of Risk | New Best Practice |
|---|---|
| Vendor Trust | Treat negotiators like critical third-party vendors. Vet thoroughly. |
| Crypto Payments | Use dual controls. Never allow one person full access. |
| Incident Response Logs | Keep forensic audit trails of every access point and interaction. |
| Negotiation Oversight | Monitor channels like Tutanota, Telegram, and proxy comms. |
| Credential Handling | Reset all access granted to outside parties post-incident. |
The Cybersecurity Firm Sygnia and DigitalMint Fallout
Both Sygnia and DigitalMint confirmed the individuals were not acting under their authority and emphasised these were rogue operations done independently. Ryan Clifford Goldberg was a former employee of Sygnia Cybersecurity Services, also known as cybersecurity giant Sygnia, and was a Sygnia employee at the time of the alleged involvement, but acted independently.
Sygnia clarified that its systems and infrastructure were not compromised and the company maintains a strong reputation in incident response. Still, the reputational damage is real and the trust deficit grows.
This incident highlights why incident response vendors must limit and monitor internal access, especially where negotiation and privileged credentials are concerned.
The Future of Negotiation Risk
Expect the following shifts:
- Increased regulation of ransomware negotiators, including licensing and mandatory reporting.
- Insurers tightening their vendor requirements, especially around negotiation firms.
- Security teams baking negotiation into their threat models, not as a post-event service but as a potential attack vector.
- Cybersecurity companies facing stricter controls and oversight in response to the government’s investigation into ransomware negotiator misconduct, with increased scrutiny of their employees’ activities.
FAQs: Ransomware Negotiator Gone Rogue
Who were the individuals involved?
Ryan Clifford Goldberg (Sygnia) and Kevin Tyler Martin (DigitalMint), now indicted for multiple ransomware deployments. A third individual, described as a co-conspirator, is also under investigation for their suspected involvement in the scheme.
Why is this case so serious?
Because they were they were ransomware negotiator who flipped roles and used inside intel to target victims.
Is this the first such case?
It’s the first public indictment of this kind but security professionals have warned this was inevitable there is an old trope that Cyber Security professionals are often involved in black hat attacks. US ransomware negotiators have rarely been implicated in such schemes.
What should companies do differently now?
Apply third-party risk controls to negotiators just like you would a cloud provider or critical supplier. Demand oversight, logging, and transparency. Other victims included a pharmaceutical company, a medical device maker, an engineering company based in California, and a drone manufacturer.
Does this mean all negotiators are threats?
Not at all. But it does mean that unquestioned trust is no longer acceptable in this role. The scope of the attacks included other victims beyond those named in the indictment.
How do you spot a potentially compromised negotiator?
Delays in communication, suspicious payment channels, inconsistencies in attacker messaging, or attempts to conceal logs.
Conclusion: A Shift in the Ransomware Landscape
The ransomware ecosystem is so profitable and structured that a parallel industry now exists to handle negotiations. Yet, critics argue that these services only encourage more attacks and in this case, they appear to be right.